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Conceiving of 
Products and 
the Products 
of Conception: 
Reflections on 
Commodification, 
Consumption, 
ART, and 
Abortion
Jody Lyneé Madeira
“A good wit will make use of any thing: I will 
turn diseases to commodity.”
Sir John Falstaff,  
King Henry IV, Part II, Act I, Scene II
Introduction
Thorny and difficult questions permeate the issue of 
commodification of assisted reproductive technolo-
gies (ART) and abortion. Are ART and abortion ser-
vices or medical treatment? Are those who seek them 
patients or consumers? How should we understand 
the complex relationship between money, markets, 
choice, and the care relationship? 
This paper rejects the dichotomy between patient 
and consumer roles and focuses instead on how attri-
butes of each are meaningful to those seeking health 
care. Arguing that health care is already commodi-
fied, it suggests that both medicine and the market 
offer strategies for handling commodification. The 
important questions are how we understand these 
attributes and their role in care relationships, and 
which attributes we should encourage. The medical 
profession and patient role have long accommodated 
commodification, using fiduciary roles, flat fees and 
opaque pricing to distance payment and pricing from 
care provision. In contrast, the market and consumer 
role emphasize choice and consumer agency, arms-
length transactions, and exchange for value. To avoid 
the dehumanization of the commodification critique, 
health care can be restructured to combine elements 
of both patient and consumer choice models. 
The first step is to untangle two discourses usually 
positioned as contradictory and competing: patient vs. 
consumer and commodification vs. non-commodifica-
tion. Social science research shows that “patient” and 
“consumer” are not useful to most care-seekers, the 
vast majority of whom define themselves as patients. 
Rather, these terms are umbrella concepts that stand 
for several attributes — agency, responsibility, com-
munication, compassion, and so on. By identifying as 
a “patient” or a “consumer,” care-seekers signal what 
attributes are important, and in what degree (e.g., how 
they prefer providers to display empathy, and how 
important that attribute is compared to others). The 
ideal care relationship merges the attributes of both 
the patient and consumer roles that they subjectively 
judge “best” — high communication, high empathy, 
high choice, medium agency — rendering the distinc-
tion between the patient/consumer roles unimportant.
Jody Lyneé Madeira, J. D. Ph.D., is Professor of Law and 
Louis F. Niezer Faculty Fellow at the Maurer School of Law at 
Indiana University Bloomington. 
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Commodification also impacts reform. Scholars 
usually focus on the market/altruism dichotomy, on 
whether or not a price is charged, and perhaps on the 
doctor-patient relationship. But commodification’s 
positive and negative aspects come not from the doc-
tor-patient relation or payment of fees but from the 
physician’s orientation to her role and to other doc-
tors — how doctors judge success, and what medical 
enterprises are organized to achieve. Interestingly, the 
“best” physicians and clinics are not non-commodi-
fied, but redefine commodified care. They do not try 
to escape the market or work against it, but use it to 
streamline services without sacrificing care. 
In Part I, this essay defines the roles of patient and 
consumer, and then describes how they are ultimately 
less important than the attributes of which they are 
comprised. In Part II, it describes theories of com-
modification and consumption in reproductive con-
texts and their negative and positive consequences, 
from compliance and coercion to resistance and cre-
ativity. It also examines whether ART and abortion 
are “markets,” when, and with what effects. In Part III, 
this essay explores how the attributes which comprise 
the patient/consumer roles can be incorporated into 
health care reform, and the implications that various 
health care reform models would have for ART and 
abortion. 
Beyond the Patient/Consumer Dichotomy
Redefining Patients and Consumers
Derived from the Latin “patiens” (“to suffer” or “to 
bear”), a patient is often characterized in social science 
and popular culture as sick, vulnerable, having few if any 
choices, and passive.1 On one hand, the term may trigger 
stigma, abnormality, or even neuroticism; on the other, 
it can initiate therapeutic relationships.2 “Patient” may 
not accurately describe “healthy” individuals who seek 
preventative care, advice, or elective services, and it can 
imply patient passivity and provider omniscience.3 A 
patient is in a “thick” relationship with an alter ego — a 
care-provider or physician.4 This relation is inherently 
unequal because patients lack equal power, status, and 
knowledge and therefore depend upon doctors, who 
attempt to heal but may inadvertently harm. This rela-
tionship may include compassion and trust, “openness 
and respect,” but also authoritarianism and paternal-
ism.5 The law acknowledges patients’ vulnerability by 
creating a protective rights scheme, creating a fiduciary 
doctor-patient relationship in contrast to the “caveat 
emptor” consumer standard.6 
In contrast, both in health care and in commerce 
more broadly, consumer implies a transaction in 
which service is exchanged for payment. A consumer 
experiences services or ingests products.7 The term 
“consumer” can empower, infuse normality into stig-
matized and subordinated experiences and identi-
ties, decrease paternalism and demedicalize care roles 
and relationships.8 It might better fit healthy persons 
seeking preventative care or advice.9 Moreover, “con-
sumer” connotes rationality, vocality, and choice over 
products and uses. 
Ideally, a health care consumer weighs medical costs 
against perceived benefits and obtains care from the 
“best value” provider.10 As market creatures, consumers 
are active in health care decision-making, armed with 
information, confidence, assertiveness, and the rights 
to demand treatment access, options, providers, and 
desires.11 Unlike patients, consumers need not be in 
relationships with physicians at all; if they are, the rela-
tionship is arms-length, like “businessman-customer,” 
and connotes financial remuneration, commerce and 
industry, and the “generic contractual aspects of a 
standardized professional service.”12 Premised on an 
economic-legalistic rather than moral-ethical frame-
work, this relation emphasizes “efficiency, profit maxi-
mization, consumer satisfaction, ability to pay, plan-
ning, entrepreneurship, and competitive models.”13 The 
commercialization of “consumer” inspires discomfort 
or even visceral dislike in most care professionals, for 
whom it trivializes the care relationship and renders 
professionals entrepreneurs.14 
This paper rejects the dichotomy between patient and consumer roles and 
focuses instead on how attributes of each are meaningful to those seeking 
health care. Arguing that health care is already commodified, it suggests that 
both medicine and the market offer strategies for handling commodification. 
The important questions are how we understand these attributes and their 
role in care relationships, and which attributes we should encourage.
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Mining these role descriptions reveals stark dispari-
ties. Patients are supposedly unwell, in need, vulnera-
ble, passive, devoid of agency and choice, stigmatized, 
lack control, and in an inherently unequal treatment 
relationship. In relationships with care professionals, 
patients seek compassion, trust, openness, respect, 
information, competence, and guidance; paternalism 
may even be expected or welcomed. Health care con-
sumers, on the other hand, are allegedly competent, 
rational, independent, active, assertive, informed, 
free to choose services and providers (or walk away). 
They have purchasing power, and are not necessarily 
in a treatment relationship (again, this portrait con-
trasts with the vulnerable consumer within consumer 
protection). In treatment relations, consumers seek 
value and competence. From this perspective, the 
patient and consumer roles appear locked in a con-
test between “haves” and “have-nots.” Both roles seem 
too extreme to encapsulate care-seekers’ lived experi-
ences, but strand most in the messy middle.
But if we look past labels to what “makes” a patient 
or consumer, we can see that they are comprised of sev-
eral attributes which individuals may feel are more or 
less important for them to adopt in their relationships 
with care providers: self-capacity, control, agency, 
advocacy, and choice or opportunity. Similarly, most 
care seekers will prioritize certain qualities in “good” 
care provider relationships: trust, openness, compas-
sion or sensitivity, respect, communication (includ-
ing information and dialogue), continuity, commit-
ment, competence, and affordability. These attributes 
become important because we cannot “inspect” ser-
vice quality before treatment and must negotiate 
uncertainty through a “generalized belief in the abil-
ity of the physician.”15 Of course, certain attributes are 
more important given individual preferences, needs, 
or treatment contexts. For example, building trust 
in ART, where women usually make several visits to 
one provider, will be different than in abortion, where 
most make one or two visits. 
Focusing on the attributes that comprise the patient 
and consumer roles overcomes the many limitations of 
regarding these roles as a dichotomy. It avoids seman-
tic puzzles and reflects that “the roles of doctor/pro-
vider and patient/consumer are hard to disentangle.”16 
It explains our discomfort over “consumer” and our 
urge to preserve what seems valuable about “patient.” 
It rescues us from comparisons between those “ill and 
seeking help” and those “purchasing a pair of socks 
or a pound of sausages.”17 These attributes become 
unique goods inherent in medical ideology and care 
relations, comprising the “care” in the care relation. 
They help determine care-seekers’ provider satisfac-
tion, make care experiences feel less or non-commod-
ified, and are tools for demanding “better” care. Care-
seekers think in terms of these attributes, not in terms 
of patient and consumer roles. Ideally, these attributes 
themselves become goods that care-seekers and pro-
viders exchange within relationships, and for which 
many may willingly pay higher costs. Moreover, this 
approach means that care seekers and providers are 
not restricted to one “role” within the relationship, but 
have the freedom to prioritize certain attributes over 
time and in response to developments in the treat-
ment relationship. 
 By themselves, “patient” and “consumer” labels 
give little information about care-seeker behaviors, or 
whether they are helpful or problematic. But focus-
ing on role attributes gives us an exponentially more 
detailed experiential view, allowing us to assess and 
remedy specific harms rather than judging care-seek-
ers to be failing as patients or consumers. We can most 
effectively improve care experiences by prioritizing 
different attributes. 
The patient/consumer debate has, however, pro-
vided guidance on which attributes are most impor-
tant. Most social science scholars and commentators 
prefer “patient” because of care-seekers’ vulnerability, 
relational dependence, patient rights and the term’s 
emphasis on beneficence (versus autonomy), the doc-
tor-patient relation, and its emphasis on partnership 
over mere choice.18 Unsurprisingly, most care-seekers 
surveyed (and often the vast majority) see themselves 
as “patients”19 — a proxy for expressing comfort with 
a certain attribute bundle over others. Focusing on 
the attributes comprising patient and consumer roles 
frees us from purchasing a role “package” or engag-
ing in debates over role superiority. Moreover, these 
attributes play key roles in how care-seekers negotiate 
reproductive commodification within ART and abor-
tion, refocusing on the humanity of a treatment expe-
rience situated within the market. 
From Reproductive Commodification to 
Reproductive Creativity and Beyond 
Debates over patient and consumer roles become 
more complex when mapped onto questions of how 
markets and commodification affect ART and abor-
tion. This essay argues that reproductive health care 
is inherently commodified. Therefore, it focuses pri-
marily on how we negotiate and experience commodi-
fied reproductive care. Focusing on which attributes 
care seekers prioritize is critical. Care seekers earmark 
these attributes as significant based on their experi-
ences within a commodified treatment environment, 
and can guide reforms. If it is good for business to 
focus on these attributes in all care environments, 
these attributes will become available to care-seekers 
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of all socioeconomic statuses. Hence, commodification 
can benefit, not just burden, those least well off. Thus, 
just as we rejected the patient/consumer dichotomy, 
we must push beyond the commodification/non-com-
modification dichotomy to focus on how these attri-
butes are present in consumer experience and affect 
providers’ orientation to care seekers, colleagues and 
practice areas.
Reproductive Commodification,  
Consumptive Creativity
Commodification refers to “the economic and cultural 
processes” through which objects become marked as 
commodities, and their consequences.20 Goods or ser-
vices become commodities — things to be exchanged 
for value — by acquiring exchange and use values in 
a marketplace.21 Commodities are external to peo-
ple, and may seem like alien objects in commercial 
space, “cold and sterile” entities that functionally 
serve human needs and can be manipulated.22 But 
our relationships with commodities may change; once 
acquired, commodities can be appropriated and per-
sonalized. Commodification and commodities acquire 
value through consumption, “the purchase and use of 
goods, services, materials, or energy.”23 
Problems arise when comparing objects that can be 
valued in different ways, such as shoes and sex; while 
some argue that both can have monetary value, others 
would object to putting a price on sex. “Both pro- and 
anti-commodification camps” tend to “frame discus-
sions in terms of an on-off decision about whether 
or not to commodify,” so that the “discussion [] fol-
lows fixed rails, forever trying to pinpoint the proper 
boundary between market and nonmarket transac-
tions.”24 Others have argued that there are degrees of 
commodification, from universal, to incomplete or 
partial to no commodification.25 
Opposition to reproductive commodification pro-
duces strange bedfellows. Both conservatives and 
liberals co-opt commodification discourse support-
ing certain “protective” restrictions or improved con-
ditions in abortion and ART. Barred from shutting 
down abortion markets entirely (under the “undue 
burden” standard in Planned Parenthood v. Casey), 
conservatives want to impose market constraints pre-
sented as choice architecture.26 Basing regulations 
on “women-protective anti-abortion” reasoning, they 
support waiting periods, informed consent modifica-
tions, extended counseling, ultrasounds, clinic com-
pliance with hospital building guidelines, restricted 
public funding and mandatory provider admitting 
privileges.27 After the Missouri legislature extended a 
24-hour abortion waiting period to 72 hours on May 
13, 2014, “Missouri Right to Life” released a state-
ment asserting “[this bill] will save babies and protect 
all women…from abortion clinics seeking to make a 
profit on an abortion.”28 Liberals also adopt consumer 
rhetoric, but to preserve choice, stressing women’s 
“right to choose,” access to “safe” abortion, or “abortion 
on demand.” One advocacy guide advises “consumer 
demand is a powerful tool for change” and asserts that 
“women — the consumers or primary beneficiaries 
of safe abortion — can have a strong effect on many 
aspects of health care by demanding change.”29 
Reactions to commodification and consumption 
have changed over time. Theorists have long disagreed 
over how commodification affects human potentials 
for creativity and identity-formation. Early economic 
approaches such as Marxism posited that workers 
became alienated from their labor when consum-
ing goods, transforming social relations into rela-
tions between things.30 For Frederic Jameson and the 
Frankfurt School, such market relations manipulated 
consumers into satisfying producers’ needs and gener-
ating profits.31 Similarly, reproduction has been anal-
ogized to industrial factory production, with preg-
nancy as factory floor, the uterus as baby-producing 
machine, the pregnant woman as laborer, the doctor 
as foreman dedicated to a production schedule and 
fetuses as commodities.32 
The Chicago School and law and economics move-
ments embraced universal commodification – a mar-
ket for everything.33 Most since then oppose universal 
commodification,34 targeting the parent/surrogate-
children and donor/patient-physician relationships. 
Addressing egg donation, surrogacy, prenatal test-
ing and preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), 
scholars argue that women’s bodies and reproductive 
capacities, embryos, fetuses, and children should not 
be commodified, and warn that ART can coerce and 
exploit patients. They argue that it is impossible or 
unwise to monetarily value certain goods, that mon-
etary valuation does not capture these goods’ signifi-
cance, that valuation and exchange can warp those 
goods, and that transactions exchanging these goods 
for money are involuntary or accessed unequally.35 
Many of these arguments presume that intimate rela-
tions and economic transactions belong to “hostile 
worlds” or “separate spheres.”36 Conflating these cat-
egories violates human dignity and moral worth; thus, 
Margaret Jane Radin has famously urged, some goods 
should be “market-inalienable.”37 Similarly, Edmund 
Pellegrino argues health care is not a commodity since 
it “center[s] too much on universal human needs” and 
its effectiveness depends on interpersonal relations, 
not objects.38 A commodified doctor-patient encoun-
ter may become “a commercial relationship” governed 
by commerce, torts, and contracts instead of profes-
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sional ethics, fostering “profit-making and pursuit of 
self-interest.”39 
But other scholars focus on how people create per-
sonal and social identity within commodified envi-
ronments. Scholars have become more skeptical of 
anti-commodification arguments, observing that 
harm lies in how objects are used, and that such argu-
ments create caricatures of coerced victims and com-
mercial contractors.40 Kimberly Krawiec asserts that 
anti-commodification arguments are elitist, “invoked 
for political gains” by groups whose interests are “at 
odds with broader social goals,” and observes that the 
problems they target often are unrelated to commodi-
fication.41 Vivianna Zelizer posits that “markets do 
not overrun cultures but are themselves defined and 
influenced by culture,” and that market transactions 
and intimate relations are inherently interdepen-
dent.42 Martha Ertman explains how commodifica-
tion can overcome barriers violating human dignity 
(e.g., extending reproductive options for gays and 
lesbians).43 Ruth Fletcher’s theory of reproductive 
consumption focuses on how we “negotiate reproduc-
tion as a necessary human activity” that contributes 
to creativity and relationship-building and not merely 
profiteering.44 ART and abortion, then, are contexts 
where care seekers negotiate “how best to understand 
and adjudicate the relationship between ‘persons’ and 
‘things.’”45 
This essay, too, is skeptical of anti-commodification 
arguments, and argues that they are passé because 
reproduction is already inherently and almost cer-
tainly intractably commodified. The very language 
that is the rallying cry for reproductive decision-mak-
ing – choice – is more closely identified with the ste-
reotypical consumer role. Reproductive decisions such 
as whether to freeze eggs or undergo IVF or adoption 
are at base decisions about consumption and distribu-
tion.46 Thus, for Krawiec, objections to reproductive 
markets “cannot persuasively rest on concerns over 
commodification and commercialization, as the mar-
ket was commodified and commercialized long ago.”47 
The question then becomes how persons negotiate 
commodified reproductive contexts and with what 
consequences. 
Consequently, our investigations into commodifica-
tion and consumption must not stop at whether care 
seekers use treatments creatively or to modify self-
identity, but must penetrate further into their lived 
experiences of these treatments. This is essential in 
ART and abortion, where care seekers’ first goal is 
attaining or terminating pregnancy, accomplishing 
something beyond altering self-identity. These treat-
ment experiences are very different than, say, buying 
designer jeans. Focusing on the treatment experience 
also provides insight into how people consume care 
services to complete self-identity projects (i.e., attain-
ing or avoiding motherhood).48 It is important to note 
that a treatment experience can only de-commoditize, 
not non-commoditize, reproductive technologies or 
services. Just because a care seeker does not feel like 
she has had a commodified treatment experience does 
not mean that the treatment ceases to be commodi-
fied. De-commodification does not end commodifi-
cation; when goods or services are marked as “other 
than commodities,” other meanings attach despite 
commodification and become important because they 
contradict it.49 
B. ART and Abortion as Sites of Consumerism  
and Commodification
Assessing ART and abortion as commodified services 
implicates reproductive choice. Sometimes, choice 
is illusory; we make decisions in response to felt 
needs, lack of viable options, or cultural imperatives. 
Undergoing IVF, for instance, reaffirms cultural ide-
als of persistence and effort.50 Choice also connotes 
our investigations into commodification and consumption must not stop  
at whether care seekers use treatments creatively or to modify self-identity, 
but must penetrate further into their lived experiences of these treatments. 
This is essential in ART and abortion, where care seekers’ first goal is 
attaining or terminating pregnancy, accomplishing something beyond 
altering self-identity. These treatment experiences are very different than,  
say, buying designer jeans. Focusing on the treatment experience also 
provides insight into how people consume care services to complete  
self-identity projects (i.e., attaining or avoiding motherhood).
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cultural decision-making norms favoring rationality 
and reflection as well as the specter of mistake, and 
therefore invites consumer-protection measures. The 
“distinctive and crucial feature” of consumerism, after 
all, is “purchasers choosing well.”51 Care-seekers who 
exercise (consumer) “choice” (especially when footing 
large bills) face a social imperative to be a “good con-
sumer…which implies a moral judgment” that can be 
fulfilled through behaviors such as interviewing ser-
vice providers.52 Moreover, constitutional protections 
for “negative” reproductive rights compel governmen-
tal inaction, divorcing choice from access and rein-
forcing market privatization. Our reactions to com-
modifying ART and abortion may differ, according to 
whether we feel these contexts are in fact elective, and 
our perceptions of treatment relationships and pro-
viders’ orientation to colleagues and practice areas. 
In both ART and abortion, medical culture can sub-
ordinate the payment transaction as do other health 
care contexts, rendering consumption inconspicuous. 
ART is constructed as more extravagant and private, 
more “elective” (and “elite”). The stereotypical ART 
patient, after all, is the well-off older career woman 
who delayed childbearing.53 Most care-seekers expect 
to pay high prices (which may perversely increase 
ART’s mystique), expect good doctors to be well-paid, 
and anticipate that clinics will be not merely comfort-
able, clean, and sanitary but lavish and fashionable. 
We likely are more comfortable with ART’s commodi-
fication so long as it improves care quality, incentiv-
izing goods like quality provider relations and not 
factory-like treatment experiences. 
In contrast to ART, abortion implicates public con-
cerns and public health, lies at the heart of privacy 
and human rights, and is in wider demand. Because 
abortion is more stigmatized and yet is a reproductive 
right, commercial advertising of abortion services, 
for-profit abortion clinics, high procedure prices, 
and high provider salaries seem distasteful and more 
exploitative. Abortion stigma can make abortion seem 
“dirty,” and many care-seekers are surprised to find 
abortion clinics clean and sanitary, let alone comfort-
able.54 Abortion may then seem more “non-elective” 
(“non-elite” or secretive), and mainstream culture is 
less comfortable with abortion commodification, as 
illustrated by stereotypes of greedy abortion providers 
and abortion mills as well as advocates’ appeals to safe 
abortions and decreased stigma. 
art as a market
ART is a market, and market forces shape demand.55 
“Vibrant” fertility clinic websites, buoyant with babies 
and links to clinic information, treatments, financing, 
and educational resources allow clinics to reach poten-
tial patients.56 Paying for ART is also commodified; 
clinics can offer multi-cycle discounts or refund pro-
grams such as “shared risk,” provide in-house financ-
ing, or funnel care-seekers to third-party financing 
firms.57 Here, too, clinics must keep up with market 
demands; one clinic felt it needed to extend credit to 
compete with others, and these arrangements may 
enhance consumer access and loyalty.58 
But not all is sunshine and roses; market forces pro-
voke additional criticisms. Patients may be susceptible 
to doctors’ recommendations, lending terms may be 
unclear, and doctors may have conflicts of interest if 
various lenders charge them differently for patient 
loans.59 Moreover, ART patients – typically “middle-
aged, highly educated, rich, and white” who “usually 
look like very sophisticated consumers”  – may in fact 
be vulnerable and likely to suffer from depression and 
desperation, creating “almost inelastic demand.”60 In 
addition, ART care-seekers may be “unable to assess 
the costs of fertility care versus the value of a child.”61 
Finally, it is hard not to wonder about commodifica-
tion’s effect upon doctor-patient relations after reading 
a statement such as this one from the “2nd IVF World-
wide Live Congress: A Marketing Wrap-Up” which 
equates “patients” to “sales”: “Take a 10% conversion 
rate; meaning – out of every 10 legitimate inquires you 
receive, you “close” one sale, you deliver treatments to 
1 patient….you know you are converting at least 1 out 
of 10 leads into a real sale, a real patient.”62 
Scholars worry about decision-making oversight 
and responsibility. ART and in vitro fertilization 
(IVF) may function as consumer goods when treat-
ment decisions escape medical oversight, particularly 
for the uninsured; when care-seekers feel that private 
payment enables them to choose treatment and con-
trol protocols; and when market regulation controls 
access and raises prices.63 Criticism within ART warns 
that cost-conscious patients risk multiple pregnan-
cies, inter-clinic competition and lack of state regu-
lation discourage single-embryo transfers, and clinics 
deny or downplay market participation.64 Moreover, 
the industry places parenthood on a pedestal.65
Sociologist Gay Becker pushes beyond commodifi-
cation to explore how ART care-seekers as consumers 
negotiate commodification and consumption. ART 
carries cultural meanings, including identity creation 
and “hope of motherhood,” and reinforces “strong 
cultural priorities” such as optimism, autonomy and 
choice and medical miracles.66 Becker describes a 
technological race to the top, where providers pur-
sue novel treatments to satisfy care-seekers’ market-
driven expectations.67 Here, overt commodification is 
excused; neither ART’s expense nor physician profits 
may seem inappropriate to care-seekers, given ART’s 
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“magic” and cultural norms of earning high pay for 
hard work.68 
Crucially, however, ART care-seekers are often 
savvy to the commodification processes. They “often 
wonder if the…doctors’ motives are primarily medi-
cal or lucrative,” whether providers who aggressively 
recommend IVF are profiteers, and whether ART is 
“a business which operate[s] on their hopes.”69 They 
are “disgusted” by greedy doctors, insulted 
by “aggressive sales methods,” and deplore 
“consumerist” indicia like packed waiting 
rooms, visible counters of patient preg-
nancies, and providers who do not listen 
to patients or give individualized treat-
ment plans.70 In treatment relationships, 
care-seekers can “exercise control of prices 
and of obtaining quality products,” and 
resist the way that ART as a commodi-
fied service is offered through skepticism 
and complaints, even as they continue to 
undergo treatment and maintain hope.71 
Thus, Becker concludes, care-seekers are 
a driving consumer force, especially when 
“defending their own interests, and partic-
ipate thereby in the redefinition of medi-
cal treatments.”72
abortion as a market
The commodification of abortion is much more com-
plicated than in ART, and there are few analyses of 
“abortion markets.” Perhaps this is at least partially 
because abortion is still seen as a different kind of 
market. Historically, abortion provision has met with 
significant resistance. As recently as the 1970s, states 
criminalized the act of encouraging abortion through 
lectures, advertisements or other mediums. One early 
First Amendment advertising case concerning abortion 
referral service advertisements expressly commodifies 
abortion, extending protection since no party claimed 
these messages “related to a commodity or service that 
was then illegal.”73 Hospital administrators have feared 
that abortion could “threaten those types of [private] 
donations” on which hospitals increasingly rely.74 Lack 
of abortion access – a key market factor – has explained 
why many women have to cross national borders to 
obtain procedures, and why some countries may pun-
ish third parties who would profit accordingly.75 
Abortion has long been viewed as “dirty work” and 
positioned as “morally reprehensible,” particularly 
given “[o]ur silence and polarized moral debates about 
abortion.”76 Abortion was certainly marginalized when 
Joffe researched abortion care work in the late 1970s.77 
Abortion and market concepts remain dangerous bed-
fellows today; witness the 2013 “Baby S” case, where 
gestational surrogate Crystal Kelley secretly gave birth 
out-of-state after the intended parents offered her 
$10,000 to abort a fetus with birth defects (allegedly, 
the surrogate initially proposed a $15,000 counter-
offer but rescinded it before fleeing).78 This example 
illustrates the various stereotypes of how commodi-
fication purportedly affects ART and abortion. Many 
aspects of ART seem open to market negotiation, but 
abortion is usually construed as a matter of conscience 
and moral belief. The idea that money could sway a 
woman from her (assumedly) deep-seated convic-
tions, and that she could respond by demanding a 
higher price for this compromise seemed preposter-
ous to many. Thus, individuals tread lightly when they 
speak of abortion “markets”: 
[B]uying and selling, entitlement and theft, pri-
vate and public ownership, owning and disown-
ing, seem not to circulate through the discursive 
terrain of unwanted pregnancy.…This suggests 
that whatever abortion currently is or means it 
cannot and does not have anything to do with 
economy. Further, that it hints at an underlying 
value judgment: that it should not.79
 
Several reasons likely explain our reticence to speak of 
abortion “markets.” Perhaps our unease stems from the 
prominence of altruism in abortion providers’ practice 
orientations. Numerous providers accept lower earn-
ings and exponentially heightened danger to advance 
social justice, and frequently speak of their work as a 
“calling.” ART providers may choose their specialty for 
altruistic reasons, but face no comparable earnings 
reduction or danger risk. Moreover, the sharp increase 
Despite our discomfort, we cannot ignore the 
ways in which abortion services function as a 
market, and how constraints and expansions in 
abortion access have both had market effects. 
The abortion market is affected by and in 
tension with other markets. Women routinely 
enter markets to access private abortion 
services. Restricting abortion access can have 
drastic market effects, but state and market 
improvements in access and public payment 
help to de-commodify abortion, reduce its 
moral, costs and render it more routine.
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in organized violence against abortion clinics since the 
1980s may make us more hesitant to investigate (and 
expose, even in academic forums) clinic business prac-
tices than in the 1970s. Finally, abortion markets seem 
somehow more insidious; here, the specter of inequal-
ity is more horrifying, and there is wider consensus 
that health insurance should cover these procedures.80 
We sense that unequal access to abortion affects 
human flourishing in a different way than within ART. 
But despite our discomfort, we cannot ignore the 
ways in which abortion services function as a market, 
and how constraints and expansions in abortion access 
have both had market effects. The abortion market is 
affected by and in tension with other markets. Women 
routinely enter markets to access private abortion ser-
vices. Restricting abortion access can have drastic mar-
ket effects, but state and market improvements in access 
and public payment help to de-commodify abortion, 
reduce its moral, costs and render it more routine.81 
There is certainly more vocal soul-searching among 
abortion providers over the allocation of funds and the 
ethics of a for-profit ethos than among ART providers. 
Early publications document tensions between busi-
ness and social welfare models of clinic operation and 
pricing, the role of providers’ private interests, and 
reliance upon commercial or alternative mediums of 
promotion.82 
These tensions have been particularly acute for 
abortion care workers, who must balance efficiency 
and humanization and grapple with managerial 
involvement. Writing of abortion care work today, 
Todd observes that, although many employees “draw 
on the caring components of our practice,” “our jobs 
are becoming more rationalized and routinized with 
an increased emphasis on technical aspects and less 
of a focus on caring and interpersonal relations.”83 In 
her memoir, Merle Hoffman, founder, president, and 
CEO of Choices Women’s Medical Center, describes 
herself as a proponent of “informed medical con-
sumerism” and credits Roe v. Wade for initiating the 
women’s health movement and creating “the reality 
of the female medical consumer.”84 Hoffman reflects 
upon abortion provision in the 1990s, recalling that 
almost all clinics charged the same fees (except for 
“unscrupulous physicians” who charged “illegal immi-
grant women…unconscionably high rates”), and that 
she lowered fees for women coming from states with 
more restrictive abortion laws.85 Although she found 
the subject of profits was frequently uncomfortable, 
commercial success gave her power:
I was the only woman owner of a licensed abor-
tion facility in New York; yet my feminist peers 
often made me feel as though I was doing some-
thing wrong. Many in the movement felt a real 
activist should be struggling financially, or at 
least be working for a nonprofit.…I was “making 
money off the movement”….Money has given me 
many types of power. With it I have been able 
to run my clinic the way I want it to be run.…
Money has given me the power to support politi-
cal campaigns and donate to worthy causes.86 
Moreover, the anti-abortion movement has taken 
advantage of abortion commodification to inflict 
damage on abortion services by trying to shut down 
“markets.” During Operation Rescue’s protest block-
ades of one feminist clinic in the late 1980s, “business 
declined 25, 30 percent.”87 More recently, state regu-
lations — supposedly protective of women — have 
forced several clinics in embattled states such as Texas 
and Ohio to close their doors.
Like other consumption sites, abortion can facili-
tate identity creation and resistance. Women might 
terminate a pregnancy because they do not want or 
lack the resources to engage in certain forms of con-
sumption, do not want parental responsibilities, find 
the pregnancy threatens established relationships, or 
do not want this particular child. Women can create 
self-identity by accessing abortion (and perhaps even 
a particular method) and adapting that lived experi-
ence to their needs. 
Despite heavy regulation, abortion is still a con-
sumer-driven reproductive market. Clinics respond to 
specific consumer needs. British clinics have altered 
services for Irish women; American clinics near the 
Canadian border set up solicitation and referral sys-
tems, advertising, and transportation when Canada 
outlawed abortion; and American clinics have evolved 
funding schemes for low-income women.88 Moreover, 
clinics’ care ethic and women’s emotional investments 
in abortion are also commodified. Clinic advertise-
ments not only highlight compassionate care but 
explicitly value privacy and convenience; many clinics 
allow women to pay extra for a shorter wait time, to 
have support persons with them during the procedure, 
and even to close the clinic. Non-profit independent 
clinics may offer women better relational care, pri-
oritizing quality interaction between care profession-
als and care seekers (e.g., no counseling time limits), 
but at higher prices. The problem is that reproductive 
rights supporters want all women to experience these 
advantages, regardless of socioeconomic status.
Commodification, Care Experience,  
and Reform
Does consumerism proffer good guidelines for chang-
ing health care systems? Though current health care 
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systems are commodified, they lack the range of 
choices typical of true consumer markets, and thus 
health care purchasers do not enjoy the innovation 
in health care options that a consumer market would 
bring. 
Thus, once more, we encounter “choice” — which 
we hear much about but enjoy little opportunity to 
exercise. The appeal of choice within consumer mar-
kets is intertwined with self-control. Effective con-
sumer activity is coupled with autonomous person-
hood.89 Consumers must both “promote their desires 
and pleasures” and remain in control of them.90 To 
consume in excess is to lose self-control, consumer 
efficacy, and therefore respect and trust.91 But as con-
sumer protection efforts recognize, most consumers 
may have little, if any, sovereign power. Thus, this sec-
tion will focus on how current consumerist perspec-
tives harm women, whether consumer-driven health 
care models will bring positive changes, and how such 
models would impact ART and abortion. 
How Current Consumerist Perspectives  
Shortchange Women
Normative understandings of consumerism leave 
women undergoing ART or abortion in an untenable 
position. If a baby is a “product,” then these women 
have already “failed” as producers — they either can-
not get pregnant and produce the goods, or they pro-
duce a pregnancy at the wrong time or without the 
requisite desire or resources to sustain their child(ren). 
And they fail as consumers, who are supposed to exer-
cise self-control to gain mastery of themselves, and 
their (reproductive) desires and products. Sundry 
arguments have been made that couples undergoing 
ART are ruled by desperation.92 Similarly, in pro-life 
discourse, terminating a pregnancy itself evidences 
women’s failure as responsible participants in consen-
sual sex, perhaps behaving more as compulsive sexual 
consumers seeking to evade the consequences of their 
sprees. 
In fulfilling their desires to conceive or terminate 
pregnancy, women in both ART and abortion are 
supposedly seduced into services with overtones of 
excess, selfishness, profligacy, and even hedonism — 
misrepresentations that eliminate socioeconomic dis-
parities in these consumer populations. As services of 
excess, ART and abortion allegedly trivialize life and 
degrade personhood. Repeat abortion on demand 
may be construed as an immoral form of birth control, 
and continuous rounds of IVF may generate not only 
multiple pregnancies, but pregnancies of multiples. If 
“consumer practices considered as ‘normal’ all have in 
common the fact they are viewed as both the realiza-
tion of desires and their containment,”93 then popu-
lar narratives suggest that these women have neither 
realized their desires (to become pregnant or un-preg-
nant) nor contained their desires (for procreation or 
for sexual activity). 
Finally, it is significant that these reproductive 
consumers are mostly women.94 Females are stereo-
typically “profligate shoppers,”95 and representations 
of their excess and ill-considered choice are cultural 
mainstays. Moreover, mainstream society does not 
celebrate autonomous reproductive decision-making 
as it does other choices, leaving women feeling that 
that their decisions are stigmatized and silenced. In 
their reproductive consumption experiences, women 
may experience a tragic “gap, and even a trade-off, 
between internal meanings in terms of satisfaction 
and creativity and external rewards in terms of sta-
tus and recognition.”96 In other words, women are not 
accorded consumer capital for making reproductive 
choices, even though their consumption experience 
is thereby enriched. Nor are women given credit for 
learning how best to effectuate reproductive goals, 
gaining personal growth, or being effective partici-
pants in relations with partners, providers, and others. 
Consumer-Driven Health Care to the Rescue?
This essay solves the patient-consumer debate by 
focusing not on the patient/consumer dichotomy 
but on the attributes of which they are comprised. 
These same experiential attributes also provide guide-
lines for maximizing the “goods” and minimizing the 
“harms” within health care relationships and insti-
tutions. Whatever health care reforms policymakers 
choose will presuppose reproductive commodifica-
tion; in consumer-driven health care, the market 
is the medium for reform as consumption propels 
change, and other models alter market health care 
exchanges by either displacing or facilitating market 
transactions (e.g., mandating information provision, 
constraining medical malpractice litigation, etc.). 
Thus, it is difficult, if not impossible, to find realistic 
reform solutions that do not presuppose reproductive 
commodification.
Individuals such as Regina Herzlinger, a founda-
tional figure in the consumer-driven (or consumer-
directed) health care (CDHC) movement, know exactly 
what to do with these attributes: allow care-seekers as 
consumers to “voice their feelings” and effect change.97 
By itself, commodification is neutral and does not 
set clear guidelines for structuring reforms. CDHC 
emphasizes consumer control over health care rather 
than service providers and “employers and insurers.”98 
Premised on neoclassical economic “rational choice,” 
CDHC assumes patients “will demand less care if they 
are burdened with a greater responsibility for pay-
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ing the actual cost of that care,” now borne primarily 
by insurance; here, care-seekers must allocate finite 
(or scarce) resources between health care and other 
goods.99 For Herzlinger, allowing health care “insid-
ers” to guide reform is tantamount to ceding control 
to a “self-referential intellectual cartel” that quashes 
innovation out of self-interest.100 
In CDHC, change is wrought by “an assertive, 
demanding, knowledgeable group” that voices con-
cerns to industry officials until they respond with 
innovations.101 Herzlinger stresses that the system 
should be organized not by inputs such as “hospitals, 
doctors, nursing homes, drugs, technology — but by 
consumer needs.”102 Yet, she contends, Medicare and 
private insurers micromanage payment systems, while 
top-down pricing and care professionals maintain the 
status quo and retard innovation.103 A healthy con-
sumer market must have information on consumer 
satisfaction and care outcomes, even if the govern-
ment must oversee its collection and dissemination.104 
Deeming the health care industry “insular, self-refer-
ential, [and] self-protective,” Herzlinger questions the 
idea of consumer illiteracy and posits that other third-
party providers have embraced this stereotype out of 
self-protection.105 Third-party intermediaries could 
transmute available health care data into forms widely 
comprehensible and accessible to consumers.106 But 
CDHC is unlikely to be implemented, much less suc-
ceed, if physicians prioritize profits over patients or 
discourage those who do.107
In CDHC models, therefore, commodification itself 
paves the way for reform, and experiential qualities 
could guide change if incorporated into quality mea-
sures and reported to consumers. Crucially, this pre-
sumes some mechanism of allowing consumers to 
consistently weigh quality alongside cost and other 
factors in decision-making; indeed, incentives for 
evaluating and reporting on patient satisfaction and 
other quality measures are included within the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). 
Moreover, ample evidence suggests patients believe 
that these experiential qualities are enormously 
important. In qualitative interviews, ART care-seekers 
ranked physician bedside manner as extremely impor-
tant, and a frequent motivation for switching provid-
ers. In addition, the Kaiser Foundation’s “National 
Survey on Americans as Health Consumers” reported 
that 57% of respondents said that patient reviews of 
a doctor’s communication skills would tell them “a 
lot” about a doctor’s quality, ranking fourth below 
measures such as malpractice suits filed, numbers 
of procedures performed, and board certification.108 
Moreover, 57% stated that patient reviews of how 
well a health plan’s doctors communicated would tell 
them “a lot” about health plan quality.109 Incorporat-
ing experiential qualities into reform efforts may even 
increase care-seekers’ acceptance of insurance cover-
age constraints such as limited provider networks that 
include “high-quality” providers and exclude those of 
“low quality or low efficiency.”110 Finally, care-seekers’ 
choices would “help us understand the sorts of trad-
eoffs individuals are willing to make.”111
We are currently witnessing these very legal and 
cultural debates play out in the ACA contraception 
mandate. The United States Supreme Court recently 
ruled in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby that closely-held 
for-profit corporations were exempt from the Afford-
able Care Act’s contraception mandate, as it violated 
their freedoms of conscience and religion.112 Other 
mandate opponents contended that taxpayers and 
employers would be subsidizing their employees’ sex-
ual activities, commodifying sexuality and denigrating 
women’s dignity.113 Mandate supporters argued that it 
protected women’s freedom to make health care deci-
sions and that scrapping it would burden employees 
that did not share their employer’s beliefs. Therefore, 
the contraception mandate was a contest over how far 
the health care market and consumer demand extend, 
and who could set the terms along which contracep-
tives are commodified.
Consumer-Driven Health Care and ART and Abortion
Within ART and abortion, CDHC would have impor-
tant repercussions. ART more closely approximates 
a consumer-driven market than abortion, given low 
insurance coverage and lack of state regulation, mak-
ing innovation more likely. These days, innovations 
in abortion amount to contests between novel state 
restrictions and creative clinic responses. Moreover, 
if assertive, demanding, and knowledgeable con-
sumers drive market change, then change will favor 
elite interests. Consumer-driven change would not 
be democratic; instead, it would likely resemble an 
inverse oligopoly, a market dominated by a handful of 
buyers, not sellers. This is unproblematic so long as 
elite and non-elite interests and interest prioritization 
align, but these diverse populations likely value and 
prioritize cost, convenience, and access differently. 
Again, this is less of a problem in ART than in 
abortion, since scarce insurance coverage for fertility 
treatment produces a less-diverse, elite-dominated 
consumer base;114 care-seekers who are poor, poor 
advocates, or poorly informed can ride the coattails 
of their elite counterparts. ART care-seekers also 
have more reform opportunities; care relationships 
within IVF are more extensive than in abortion, where 
women make far fewer visits. Switching providers is a 
realistic option for ART care-seekers,115 but dissatis-
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fied women in abortion have limited recourse, and can 
only tell others about their experiences and perhaps 
obtain future procedures elsewhere. 
The abortion consumer base is much more 
diverse;116 women may not know that they can effect 
change or have the time or energy to think about it. 
Due to procedure stigma, population vulnerability, 
perceived urgency, and visit brevity, these women 
have fewer reform incentives and opportunities. Thus, 
reform pressure must come from professional associa-
tions or third parties — though states have been the 
heavyweights in that arena.117 Usually empowering 
and equalizing, information can work against choice 
when state-mandated “informed consent” regimens 
dispense data linking abortion to future infertility, 
breast cancer, and mental distress or illness.118 Here, 
state regulations displace markets, carving out areas 
where consumer preferences cannot control. 
In ART and abortion, insured and uninsured indi-
viduals would likely make very different choices, along 
the lines of elite versus non-elite needs and prefer-
ences. Insured individuals, freed from at least some 
anxiety over treatment cost, could prioritize relational 
quality (better care professional — seeker interac-
tion) or greater comfort or convenience. While the 
uninsured would likely prioritize cost, as private pay-
ers they may also enjoy expanded care options from 
market innovation. Bundling comprehensive wom-
en’s health care together in one clinic, however, may 
ensure that quality reforms are applied to both ART 
and abortion.
But many doubt that CDHC is the answer to care-
seekers’ prayers. For Schneider and Hall, consumer-
ism models are “doomed to disappoint” for several 
reasons: care-seekers do not match the consumer ideal 
and may evade choice, providers experience tension 
between care and financial counseling, and consumer 
models diminish our responsibility towards others 
without health care.119 Moreover, combining “mar-
ket discipline” and health care is a laudable goal, but 
“introducing value into the system” is different from 
“shifting altogether to a market commodity.”120 Thus, 
Cohen calls for caution when estimating whether state 
programs (report cards or online databases listing 
credentials and disciplinary/malpractice records) will 
successfully increase consumer information access; 
for Korobkin, CHDC demands “heroically implausi-
ble” decision-making ability of consumers facing com-
plex, new and emotional choices.121 Others are even 
less optimistic.122 According to the Kaiser Foundation, 
one in ten Americans used such information in health 
care decision-making (though few saw comparative 
information about health plans, hospitals or doctors), 
and many that did so either did not need to make a 
decision then or found the information irrelevant.123
Of course, other pathways to reform besides CDHC 
are possible. Such strategies could be market-displac-
ing, market-facilitating or market-channeling, and led 
by the government and/or by industry actors.124 Atul 
Gawande posits change is spurred by altering physi-
cians’ orientation to each other and to the profession. 
For example, big health care “chains” could “thrive 
because they provide goods and services of greater 
variety, better quality, and lower cost than would 
otherwise be available,” since vast size provides buy-
ing power, centralization, and innovation.125 Basing 
payment not only on service or process but outcome 
and quality creates financial incentives for focusing 
on clinical performance.126 Russell Korobkin proposes 
that government use choice architecture to “facilitate 
private choices,” helping individuals to make “person-
ally utility-maximizing choices” through “relative value 
health insurance” covering “medical interventions that 
meet or exceed a given level of cost-effectiveness.”127 
These models might be more paternalistic, but 
paternalism, like commodification, has neutral 
valence. In this volume, for instance, Swanson docu-
ments how Guttmacher shaped abortion and ART 
laws in the mid-20th century to eliminate the “doc-
tor’s dilemma,” where laws constrained medical treat-
ment.128 Guttmacher advocated for free choice to give 
doctors, not patients, greater freedoms in treatment 
The goal of reform is not to provide care-seekers with the freedom to 
commodify, but the freedom to negotiate commodification. The crucial 
question will always be who has the power to control the meaning of a 
commodity, and what respect is accorded alternative and contrasting meanings. 
Any effective reform model will allow care-seekers to stratify along experiential 
characteristics in diverse ways, while incentivizing helpful qualities. 
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decision making, but his efforts nevertheless ben-
efited patients.129 Swanson finds a place for paternal-
ism in medical decision-making because consumer 
demand may entail “the surrender of professional 
judgment.”130 
Regardless of the reform model, ideally the goal will 
be to create a care system that both is profitable and 
gives care-seekers what they want. Our willingness to 
tolerate unequal access to basic health care will likely 
be a pivotal factor.131 Crucially, both ART and abortion 
care could provide models for health care reform in 
other practice areas. In both contexts, providers are 
likely to give private payers cost information up front, 
and interviews with providers suggest that dialogic 
care models, creation of trust, and informed consent 
conversations are high priorities. 
Conclusion
The goal of reform is not to provide care-seekers with 
the freedom to commodify, but the freedom to negoti-
ate commodification. The crucial question will always 
be who has the power to control the meaning of a com-
modity, and what respect is accorded alternative and 
contrasting meanings. Any effective reform model will 
allow care-seekers to stratify along experiential char-
acteristics in diverse ways, while incentivizing helpful 
qualities. 
Change will not follow from labeling care-seekers 
as patients or consumers, but from perceiving them as 
embodied decision makers with unique and even con-
tradictory characteristics, needs and desires. Whether 
bottom-up or top-down, it is essential that reform 
leave room for relationality, including therapeutic 
relations where care-seekers exercise autonomy. Rela-
tional approaches have valuable precedent; in Roe v. 
Wade, the abortion decision is ascribed to the woman 
and her physician, and the ACA gives relationality 
teeth by incorporating patient satisfaction measures 
that include provider communication skills. Though 
markets, like the state, are traditionally “impersonal 
systems,” care-seekers are demanding something 
more. Allocating attention to experiential character-
istics in reform will help accommodating relational-
ity in health care models, and should prioritize those 
most in need, not most able to pay.
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